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Abstract: ORen, before they can learn something new, people have to unlearn what they think they 
already know. That is, they may have to discover that they should no longer rely on their current beliefs 
and methods. This paper describes eight viewpoints that can help people to do this. 
1. Sticking to one's . . . uh . . . depth charges 
Starting in the mid 1970s, the Swedish defense forces pursued Soviet submarines lurking off the Swedish 
coast. Time and again, the Swedes mounted large-scale anti-submarine searches that included the 
dropping of grenades and depth charges and the detonating of remote-control mines. 
For example, in May and June 1988, there were nine live-fire engagements between the Anti-Submarine 
Warfare unit and suspected foreign submarines. The Swedish Defense Ministry reacted by giving 
commanders on the scene authority to decide when to  open fire. On one occasion, "the prowler was 
detected and trapped in 282 feet of water . . . about 60 miles south of Stockholm," said a Ministry 
spokesman. The hunters opened up on the submarine with more firepower than Sweden had used 
previously. But the hunters lost contact with their prey amid the noise of exploding depth charges and 
underwater grenades, and the submarine apparently slipped away in the turbulence. "When we played 
back the tapes, we saw that the submarine was exactly where we thought it was," the spokesman 
explained. He said "it's probable" that the hunters hit and damaged the submarine although a search had 
failed to produce evidence of damage. "Our anti-submarine activities have continuously improved." 
Dozens of such searches occurred every year, always during the warmer months. Yet none of these 
searches ended with the capture of a Soviet submarine. Only once, in October 1981, did the Swedes 
actually capture a Soviet submarine, and in this instance, there had been no hunt by the defense forces. 
Rather the submarine made a navigation error and grounded on rocks along Sweden's southern coast. 
Some people theorized that the Soviets might be seeking spots where they could hide during warfare. 
Others posited that the Soviets might be testing their submarines' ability to evade detection. Still others 
speculated that the Soviets might be probing the Swedish antisubmarine defenses. The Soviets 
consistently denied that their submarines had been anywhere near Sweden, but these denials only 
reinforced the Swedes' suspicions. In 1982, in a clear reference to the Soviet Union, the chief officer of 
the navy, Rear Admiral Per Rudbeck, declared that "a foreign power is preparing for war against us". 
Sweden's ineffectiveness against the Soviet submarines, although embarrassing, did not surprise them. No 
one really expected David to defeat Goliath. The Swedes had never intended their navy to command 
respect as a military power, whereas the Soviet navy was renowned for its skill and technology. 
Then in February 1995, Sweden's defense chief Owe Wiktorin told a news conference that the Swedish 
navy had acquired new hydrophonic instruments in 1992, and these had shown that minks give off sounds 
similar to submarines. Earlier equipment had identified the sounds as submarines, he said, but there may 
never have been Soviet submarines lurking off the Swedish coast. "The intruding submarines were not 
submarines but minks, or at least most likely minks." Wiktorin said the Defense Ministry was certain that 
no foreign submarines had intruded into Sweden's territorial waters since 1992; defense analysts were 
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checking sound recordings of suspected submarines from before 1992 to see if the sounds were really just 
small animals like minks and otters swimming from island to island. Eventually, Wiktorin reported: 
"There is overwhelming evidence (technical, acoustical, and visual) that there have been five foreign 
submarine operations on Swedish territory since 198 1 ," including the Soviet submarine that ran aground 
in 1981. 
That the navy might pursuing animals had been proposed as early as July 1987. After the navy had 
dropped depth charges and fired anti-submarine grenades unsuccessfLlly for almost three weeks in search 
of foreign intruders, Tero Harkonen, a Swedish seal expert, speculated that the anti-submarine hunt had 
been triggered by the play of young seals. "They can play, gush through the water, and even create foam 
on the surface," he explained. However, navy officials maintained that the navy had surrounded a foreign 
mini-submarine or another type of underwater vessel with nets. They declared that there had been many 
"reliable" sightings of suspected alien submarines and submarine activity in the area over the preceding 
two months, including air bubbles from a diver. The navy continued searching and dropping depth 
charges for another ten days before giving up the effort. 
The Swedish Defense Ministry's recognition of error was partly the result of a change in government: A 
different political party had control in 1995. The recognition was also partly a result of the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had collapsed, and its no-longer-so-secretive remnants no longer 
seemed capable of the remarkable underwater feats that the Swedes had been attributing to them. Indeed, 
during their 1995 review of earlier antisubmarine hunts, the Swedes consulted Russian antisubmarine 
experts. The Russian experts, the Swedes reported, agreed that the Swedes had been pursuing submarines 
but denied that the submarines had been Soviet ones. 
This story illustrates three points. First, learning often cannot occur until after there has been unlearning. 
Unlearning is a process that shows people they should no longer rely on their current beliefs and methods. 
Because current beliefs and methods shape perceptions, they blind people to some potential 
interpretations of evidence. As long as current beliefs and methods seem to produce reasonable results, 
people do not discard their current beliefs and methods (Kuhn, 1962). As Henry Petroski (1992: 
180-1 8 1) put it: "Technologists, like scientists, tend to hold onto their theories until incontrovertible 
evidence, usually in the form of failures, convinces them to accept new paradigms." Indeed, the Swedish 
navy shows that people may adhere to their current beliefs and methods despite very poor results. Even 
after two decades of abject failure, the leaders of the Swedish navy continued to  construe their 
organization's failures as the logical result of an amateurish defense force from a small country competing 
against a highly sophisticated defense force from a large country. 
Surprisingly perhaps, technical experts may be among the most resistant to new ideas and to evidence 
that contradicts their current beliefs and methods. Their resistance has several bases. Experts must 
specialize and their specialized niches can become evolutionary dead-ends (Beyer, 1981). Because 
experts' niches confer high incomes and social statuses, they have much to lose from social and technical 
changes. Expertise creates perceptual filters that keep experts from noticing social and technical changes 
(Armstrong, 1985). Even while experts are gaining perception within their domains, they may be 
overlooking relevant events just outside their domains. 
Second, organizations make it more difficult to  learn without first unlearning. People in organizations find 
it hard to ignore their current beliefs and methods because they create explicit justifications for policies 
and actions. Also, they integrate their beliefs and methods into coherent, rational structures in which 
elements support each other. These coherent structures have rigidity that arises from their complex 
interdependence. As a result, people in organizations find it very difficult to  deal effectively with 
information that conflicts with their current beliefs and methods. They do not know how to accommodate 
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dissonant information and they find it difficult to change a few elements of their interdependent beliefs 
and methods. The Swedish sailors who conducted the searches had been trained to interpret certain 
sounds as a submarine and rising bubbles as a diver; they had not been prepared for the sounds and 
bubbles made by animals. A Swedish navy that had just spent three weeks dropping depth charges and 
antisubmarine grenades in the belief that it had trapped an intruder was not ready for the idea that it had 
been deceived by plafil young seals. 
Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) characterized organizations' development as long periods of 
convergent, incremental change that are interrupted by brief periods of "frame-breaking change. " They 
said "frame-breaking change occurs in response to or, better yet, in anticipation of major environmental 
changes." However, even if abrupt changes do sometimes "break" people's old perceptual frameworks, 
the more common and logical causal sequence seems to be the opposite one. That is, people undertake 
abrupt changes because they have unlearned their old perceptual frameworks. 
Third, unlearning by people in organizations may depend on political changes. Belief structures link with 
political structures as specific people espouse beliefs and methods and advocate policies (Hedberg, 198 1). 
Since people resist information that threatens their reputations and careers, it may be necessary to  change 
who is processing information before this information can be processed effectively. Thus, a change in 
control of the Swedish government may have been essential before the Defense Ministry could concede 
the possibility of errors in the conduct of antisubmarine hunts. A change in control of the Soviet Union 
may have been essential before the Swedes could allow the possibility of Russian vulnerability or 
truthfulness. 
Top managers' perceptual errors and self-deceptions are especially potent because senior managers can 
block actions proposed by their subordinates. Yet, senior managers are also especially prone to perceive 
events erroneously and to overlook bad news. Although their high statuses often persuade them that they 
have more expertise than other people, their expertise tends to be out-of-date. They have strong vested 
interests, and they know they will catch the blame if current policies and actions prove wrong (Starbuck, 
1989). 
There is, of course, every reason for people to suspect that current beliefs and methods are wrong. Not 
only do new discoveries convert good current beliefs and methods into no-longer-good, but there is 
normally no reason to trust that current beliefs and methods ever were good. The QWERTY keyboard 
provides an on-going reminder of the persistence of poor methods (Gould, 1986). Although C. L. Sholes 
had reasons for placing the keys in particular positions, he designed QWERTY for a machine that differed 
considerably from modern typewriters. The widespread adoption of QWERTY was fostered by a highly 
publicized contest between two typists in 1888. Frank E. McGurrin, the typist who used QMERTY, won 
by a large margin. But McGurrin had memorized the keyboard and could type without looking at his 
fingers whereas his competitor had to look at his keyboard in order to find the right keys. 
2. How People Can Foster Unlearning 
"There is not the slightest indication that (nuclear] energy will ever be obtainable. It would mean that 
the atom would have to be shattered at will. " Albert Einstein, physicist, 1932. 
Einstein later wrote to President Roosevelt to urge that the United States attempt to construct an atomic 
bomb. 
This article suggests ways to facilitate unlearning. Since the essential requirement for unlearning is doubt, 
any event or message that engenders doubt about current beliefs and methods can become a stimulus for 
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unlearning. There are at least eight viewpoints that can help people turn events and messages into such 
stimuli. People can start from the premises that current beliefs and methods are "not good enough" or 
"merely experimental." They can turn surprises, dissents, and warnings into question marks. They can 
listen carefully t o  the ideas of collaborators and strangers. They can look for feedback paths and they can 
try to  synthesize divergent interpretations of phenomena. 
"It isn't good enough." 
Dissatisfaction is probably the most common reason for doubting current beliefs and methods. But 
dissatisfaction can take a very long time produce results. 
Robert Fulton launched the first commercially successful steamboat in American waters in 1807 
(Petroski, 1996; Ward, 1989). In 18 16, the boiler on a steamboat exploded and injured or killed nearly all 
of the boat's crew. Over the next thirty years, boilers exploded on 230 American steamboats. Thousands 
died; more were maimed. 
Some people said these explosions were "acts of God;" others attributed them to demons in the boilers; 
still others theorized that high temperatures decomposed water into hydrogen and oxygen, which then 
recombined explosively. In 1824, the inventors and mechanics of Philadelphia formed the Franklin 
Institute and this Institute sought to study the causes of boiler explosions. By 1830, boiler explosions had 
become the Institute's highest priority, but it lacked the funds to conduct experiments so it sent out 
questionnaires. However, a particularly bloody explosion in 1830 induced Congress to ask the Secretary 
of the Treasury to investigate, and he granted hnds  to the Franklin Institute. This $1 500 was the first 
research grant awarded by the U.S. government. The Institute's experiments disproved some theories 
about boilers and showed some unexpected effects. It submitted a report on explosions to Congress in 
1836 and a report on boiler materials in 1837. 
In April 1838, a steamboat exploded and killed about 200 people, which motivated Congress to pass the 
Steamboat Act of 1838. Unfortunately, the law required inspection of boilers but it did not provide 
inspectors and it did not require that a steamboat be removed from service if it failed an inspection. Many 
more steamboats exploded. Finally, in 1852, Congress set up a regulatory agency with enforcement 
powers. 
But the legislation and the regulatory agency focused solely on steamboats, although boilers had also 
been exploding in factories. Indeed, there were several hundred boiler explosions annually and they 
continued into the twentieth century. The worst was a steamboat explosion that killed 1200 to 1500 
people in 1865. However, by the mid 1880s, there was general understanding that the explosion were due 
to excessive pressures, defective materials, or inadequate or malfunctioning equipment. 
"It's only an experiment." 
People who see themselves as experimenting are willing to deviate temporarily from practices they 
consider optimal in order to test their assumptions. When they deviate, they create opportunities to 
surprise themselves. They also run experiments in ways that reduce the losses failures would produce. For 
instance, they attend carefully to feedback. They place fewer personal stakes on outcomes looking 
successful, so they can evaluate outcomes more objectively. They find it easier to alter their beliefs and 
methods to allow for new insights. They keep on trying for improvements because they know 
experiments rarely turn out perfectly. 
For example, in 1964, 3M corporation began an exploratory research program to develop new adhesives. 
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Spencer Silver, one of the chemists working on this project, later explained: "In the course of this 
exploration, I tried an experiment to see what would happen if I put a lot of it into the mixture. Before, 
we had used amounts that would correspond to conventional wisdom. . . . If I had sat down and factored 
it out beforehand, and thought about it, I wouldn't have done the experiment. If I had really cracked the 
books and gone through the literature, I would have stopped. The literature was full of examples that said 
you can't do this notepads" (Nayak & Ketteringham, 1986: 57). The result was that Silver found a 
radically new adhesive: It sticks to surfaces without bonding tightly so it removes easily without leaving 
traces. It was so unusual that Silver and others at 3M had great difficulty seeing how it could be applied 
usefully. But it eventually spawned an important new product line: Post-It note pads. 
"Surprises should be question marks." 
Events that violate expectations, both unpleasant disruptions and pleasant surprises, can become 
opportunities for unlearning. For instance, the Allies developed the tank during World War I, and most 
army officers viewed the tank as lethargic support for the infantry (Fleming, 1995). However, George S. 
Patton, the commander of an American tank unit had trained as a cavalryman and he saw the tank as 
being able to perform the cavalry hnction of reconnaissance. At battle of St.-Mihiel, a wide no-man's 
land developed and Patton ordered a three-tank patrol to advance until it found the enemy lines. When 
German cannons fired on the patrol, its commander, Ted McClure, ordered his tanks to charge, with the 
result that they routed the Germans and destroyed the cannons. This provided a conceptual breakthrough 
for Patton, and subsequently other army officers, by showing that tanks could make daring attacks. 
Marcie Tyre and Wanda Orlikowski (1 994) studied technological adaptation in production processes. 
Sixty percent of the adaptation occurred during the first 2.5 months after the introduction of new 
processes, but 23 percent of the adaptation occurred during a second 2.4-month spurt that started about 
eleven months after the introduction of new processes. These later spurts were initiated by events -- such 
as new equipment, new production requirements, or new personnel -- that disrupted routine operations 
and stimulated new thinking about the technology and its use. It took disruptions to induce rethinking 
because users rapidly came to accept the deficiencies and inadequacies of new technologies. 
Too often, however, the analyses following disruptions extend only to the immediate causes of the 
specific disruptions. If disruptions are to affect unlearning strongly, people need to use them to reveal 
weaknesses in their current beliefs and methods as well as to stimulate improvements. Why didn't the 
original designs anticipate the events that caused disruptions? Would organizational changes or different 
engineering concepts have fostered more robust designs? 
The North American power grid seems to illustrate ineffective unlearning. In 1964, the U. S. Federal 
Power Commission stated that the North American electric-power grid could deal effectively with a 
nuclear attack (Chiles, 1985). On November 9, 1965, one of Toronto's power stations began having 
minor mechanical difficulties, so Toronto began drawing more power from a station at Niagara Falls. A 
relay at the Niagara Falls station incorrectly sensed an overload and disconnected the overloaded 
transmission line from the power grid. This switched 375 million watts onto four other lines that were 
already near capacity. They too disconnected, so 1.5 billion watts flowed onto two lines that fed into 
northern New York. This power surge disconnected another connection between the U. S. and Canada, 
so Ontario was both short of power and unable to receive it. Circuit breakers clicked open throughout the 
eastern U. S. and separated the power grid into subsystems. In a few areas, the resulting blackouts lasted 
less than fifteen minutes. In New York City, the blackout lasted thirteen hours. Although New York City 
had enough generating capacity not only to sustain itself but to supply power northward, the human 
dispatcher did not push the right eight buttons quickly enough. Many generators were very difficult to 
restart after all power had shut down because starting them required external electric power. 
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The blackout evoked controversy. Some argued that an integrated power grid was inherently faulty; 
utilities should have weak ties to prevent disruptions from cascading. Others argued that strong ties 
enable utilities to  accommodate disruptions, so the ties should be strengthened and the grid expanded. 
The advocates of stronger ties carried the day. Electric power companies organized into nine "reliability 
regions", and much control was transferred from humans to automatic systems. 
However, in June 1967, an overloaded transmission line in Pennsylvania initiated the second biggest 
blackout, which affected 13 million people in four states. More procedural improvements followed, but 
stronger ties have called for more complex control equipment that has been more likely to fail or to 
produce unexpected results. Wider-scale integration has meant that events can have consequences 
thousands of miles away. There were more power outages during 1976 than during any previous year. 
Then on July 13, 1977, lightning hit Consolidated Edison's transmission lines several times in a few 
minutes, another human operator made another mistake, and New York City again blacked out. More 
procedural improvements followed, but there were more power outages during 198 1 than during any 
previous year. 
"All dissents and warnings have some validity." 
It is, of course, not literally true that every dissenter is right or that every warning should be taken 
seriously. There are a few loonies out there. But, for each loony, there are dozens of sensible people who 
see things going wrong and try to alert others. Listeners need to guard against hasty rejections of bad 
news or unfamiliar ideas. At a minimum, dissents and warnings can remind people that diverse viewpoints 
exist and that their own beliefs and methods may be wrong. 
Organizational hierarchies tend to block dissents and warnings. Lyman Porter and Karlene Roberts 
(1 976) reviewed studies indicating that people in hierarchies talk upward and listen upward. They send 
more messages upward than downward, they pay more attention to messages from their supervisors than 
to ones from their subordinates, and they try harder to establish rapport with supervisors than with 
subordinates. The messages that do get through enhance good news and suppress bad news (Janis, 1972; 
Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984). This bias becomes problematic because bad news is much more likely to 
motivate people to change than is good news (Hedberg, 198 1). 
Elting Morison (1966) recounted how by the U. S. Navy learned to shoot much more accurately. In 1899, 
many gunners on five ships fired at the hulk of a ship for five minutes and achieved only two hits. Six 
years later, a single gunner fired at a small target for one minute and made fifteen hits. 
This improvement came from the eflForts of Percy Scott, William S. Sims, and Theodore Roosevelt. Scott, 
a British naval officer, developed aiming techniques, gun sights, and gears that greatly enhanced gunners' 
accuracy. Sims, an American naval officer, met Scott, learned of his improvements, and tried them on his 
own ship. Impressed by the results, Sims then began to write reports to naval bureaus in Washington. 
First, the naval bureaus ignored Sims' reports. Then, using incorrect logic and contrived data, the Bureau 
of Ordnance rebutted Sims' reports. They proved with mathematics that Sims' methods could not possibly 
work even though he, Scott, and other officers were using them. After two years of this rejection, Sims 
wrote to President Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt listened and appointed Sims the Inspector of Target 
Practice. In this position, Sims taught the U. S. Navy to shoot. 
How can people decide whether to take dissents or warnings seriously? Four rules seem sensible. First, 
assume that all dissents and warnings are at least partially valid. Second, try to find evidence, apart from 
the messages' contents, about the odds that messages might be correct. For instance, do the sources of 
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the messages act as though they truly believe what they say? Are these sources speaking of topics with 
which they have experience? Third, evaluate the costs or benefits that would accrue if messages turn out 
to be correct. Fancikl messages typically entail high costs or high benefits; realistic messages likely entail 
low costs or low benefits. Thus, it is the fancihl messages that most deserve attention. Fourth, find ways 
to  test the dissents and warnings that might bring high costs or high benefits. Make probes to confirm, 
disconfirm, or modify the ideas. 
"Collaborators who disagree are both right." 
Beliefs held by qualified observers nearly always have foundations in some sort of truth. The most 
common problem is not to prove that one set of beliefs is wrong but to reconcile apparent contradictions 
by showing that they are not contradictions at all. These efforts can lead everyone to new 
conceptualizations. They can also produce some strange inversions. 
In 1937, Hannes Alfien wrote a theory about the origin of cosmic rays (Alfven, 1985). Showing that 
cosmic rays could be caused by electromagnetic effects around double stars, he pointed out that the 
known electromagnetic effects are not strong enough to fill the entire universe with cosmic rays. Thus, he 
conjectured, cosmic rays must arise in and be confined to a single galaxy. When Alfven's paper was 
rejected by the most prominent physics journal, he wondered if this was because the generally accepted 
view at that time was that cosmic rays filled the entire universe. He published the paper in a much less 
visible journal. 
In 1948, Alfien attended two lectures in which Edward Teller argued that cosmic rays must arise in and 
be confined to one solar system. Alfien struck up an argument with Teller, and Teller responded by 
inviting Alfien to present his theory in Chicago. Alfven went to Chicago, but by the time he arrived there, 
he had decided that Teller was right. Alfien and Teller co-authored a paper about the confinement of 
cosmic rays to one solar system, and Alfien went on to publish more articles and a book about this 
theory. 
After a few years, Teller changed his mind. He and almost everyone else in astrophysics came around to 
agreeing with Alfien's original theory that cosmic rays must arise in and be confined to a single galaxy. 
Alfien won the 1970 Nobel Prize in Physics partly for his early work on this topic. But Alfien himself did 
not believe in his single-galaxy theory: He continued to believe the theory Teller had originated that 
cosmic rays arise in and are confined to one solar system. 
"What does a stranger think strange?" 
It is usually easier to respect the views of collaborators than those of strangers. Unfamiliar with current 
methods and unacquainted with recent efforts, strangers are likely to make suggestions that seem nalve or 
ignorant or foolish. Yet, new people often introduce new perspectives. Although the newcomers may be 
less expert than their predecessors, they are also free of some expectations that their predecessors took 
for granted. Thus, strangers may be able to see peculiarities that the indoctrinated cannot see or they may 
be able to offer breakthrough suggestions. Indeed, "reengineering" seems to be designed to exploit this 
principle (Hammer and Champy, 1993). 
During the 1970s, the Sony Corporation produced a small, portable, monaural tape recorder (Nayak and 
Ketteringham, 1986). It was named the Pressman because Sony expected reporters to use it to record 
interviews. In 1978, the engineers who had developed the Pressman tried to upgrade it to  stereo sound. 
They succeeded in squeezing the components needed for stereo playback into the Pressman's chassis. But 
there was no room left for recording components, so the engineers were left with a recorder that could 
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not record. Of course, a stereo Pressman would also have needed a second microphone and second 
loudspeaker, presumably on extension cords. Unsure what to do, the engineers dropped the project and 
used the unsuccessfU1 prototype to play background music in their laboratory. 
Sony's founder in 1946 had been Masaru Ibuka. Although Ibuka had retired, he was called Sony's 
Honorary Chairman and he had the habit of occasionally roaming around the laboratories and factories. 
One of these tours took Ibuka into the laboratory where the tape recorder engineers were playing their 
unsuccessful prototype. "And then one day, into our room came Mr. Ibuka, our Honorary Chairman. He 
just popped into the room, saw us listening to this, and thought it was very interesting." Ibuka said he 
thought the small box was producing excellent sound. He suggested to the engineers if they had 
considered producing a machine that had no recording capability. Also, he: suggested, if the machine had 
no speaker, its batteries would last much longer. He had just visited another Sony laboratory where 
someone had developed very small headphones that might be mated to this non-recording recorder. 
Engineers and managers in both the tape recorder division and the headphone division saw no merit in 
Ibuka's idea. A tape recorder that lacked both a speaker and recording capability was no recorder at all, 
so no one would buy it. Headphones were merely a supplement to loudspeakers; if a device had only 
headphones, only one person could listen. 
Undeterred, Ibuka went to Sony's real Chairman, Akio Morita, and said: "Let's put together one of these 
things and try it. Let's see how it sounds." Morita could hardly refuse such a small request from his 
company's founder and his friend of many years. So a machine was assembled, and both Ibuka and Morita 
liked the way it sounded. They began carrying it with them wherever they went - on trips, to play sports 
-- to see how much they liked it. 
Morita decided that Sony should put the Walkman into production. This made the managers of the tape 
recorder division quite unhappy because, as they saw it, they were being ordered to produce an 
ineffective device that would almost certainly lose money. With the new lightweight headphones, it would 
cost $249. Not only was this more expensive than tape recorders with speakers that could record, but the 
expected teenage consumers could not possibly spend more than $170. The marketing managers said 
bluntly, "This is a dumb idea." Morita declared that the price would be $165, and he told the tape 
recorder division to make 60,000 of them. 
The managers of the tape recorder division judged that they were being commanded to lose $35 per unit 
sold. "There was no profit. The more we produced, the more we lost." They secretly decided to produce 
only 30,000 units and they allotted marketing a budget of only $100,000. 
Sony sold almost no Walkmans during the first month after the product's introduction. Then sales picked 
up, and during the third month, sales rocketed . . . until Sony ran out of inventory. That was when Morita 
found out that the tape recorder division had produced only 30,000 instead of 60,000. The tape recorder 
division quickly corrected its error. Six months after the product's introduction, Sony was producing and 
selling 30,000 units per month. 
During the fourth month after the Walkman's introduction, Sony began designing the Walkman I1 - much 
smaller, with better sound and longer battery life. Sony planned its production for 200,000 units per 
month. 
"All causal arrows have two heads." 
People can use thought processes that tend to disclose and challenge their tacit assumptions. One useful 
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heuristic is to insist that all causal paths carry influence in both directions: Whenever one perceives that A 
affects B, one should also look for ways in which B feeds back and affects A. There are some causal 
paths that do not carry influence in both directions. However, one-directional causation is rare because 
systems that can converge toward equilibrium have to entail feedbacks. Searching carehlly for these 
feedback paths can lead one to see previously overlooked causal paths. 
For example, Toyota developed the concept of a Just-In-Time inventory system by inverting the causal 
flow. In the traditional view, production converts raw materials into finished goods. A plant turns raw 
materials into components that feed into in-process inventories, and the plant produces finished products 
by drawing components from inventories. The finished products go into finished-goods inventories, not 
directly to customers. Customers must buy from the finished-goods inventories. Thus, analysts view 
production as flows of materials through stages of conversion; inventories uncouple these consecutive 
stages. 
According to Toyota's Taiichi Ohno, "we reversed our thinking and considered the production process in 
terms of backward flow" (Nayak and Ketteringham, 1986: 210). What flows backward is information 
about customers' desires. When customers select finished products, they create vacancies in the 
finished-goods inventory. As finished products fill these vacancies, they remove components from the 
in-process inventories. The inventory vacancies created by withdrawn components convey information 
about the finished products that customers want. The inventory vacancies cascading through the 
production process automatically decompose customers' desires into components and ultimately raw 
materials. 
Inverting the causal flow led Ohno to see production as the conversion of customers' preferences into 
demands for components and raw materials. In this view, in-process inventories become barriers that 
delay the flows of information. To speed this information flow, Toyota set out to minimize its in-process 
inventories. 
"The converse of every proposition is equally valid." 
Dialectic reasoning is a generalization of two-directional causation. Starting from a proposition (A affects 
B), one states the converse proposition (B affects A) and then one insists that both the original 
proposition and its converse are valid. The philosopher Georg Hegel, who advocated this mode of 
reasoning, called the original proposition the thesis, its converse the antithesis, and their union, the 
synthesis. As with causal paths, not every thesis has a valid antithesis and not every thesis can be 
synthesized with its antithesis. But it is possible to apply dialectic reasoning to almost all situations and 
the process of applying it helps one to break free of tacit assumptions. 
One can see dialectic reasoning in the work of Gideon Sundback, who invented the zipper (Friedel, 
1994). During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the most common method of fastening shoes was 
hooks and eyes. These were also used to fasten women's skirts and men's trousers. But fastening them 
was slow work and they did not stay fastened very well. The first zipper-like patents, which emerged in 
1893, proposed that a sliding "guide" could mate hooks and eyes. These devices were rather complex and 
they required precise assembly, so around 1904, their inventors began attaching them to cloth tape that 
could be sewn into shoes or clothing. The design, however, did not work well in that the hooks and eyes 
tended to separate when the fastener was bent or twisted. 
The company that manufactured these devices hired Gideon Sundback to improve their design. His first 
effort, although better than its predecessors, had similar deficiencies and it was a commercial failure. 
Around 1912, after pursuing improvements in the prior design for six years, Sundback came up with a 
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radically different design. In it, a slide forced the beaded edge of a cloth tape between two rows of metal 
clamps - somewhat like a Ziploc fastener. Thus, Sundback had replaced the proposition 'a fastener 
involves hooks and eyes' with its antithesis 'a fastener has neither hooks nor eyes.' 
The antithetical design also had serious deficiencies -- the cloth tape wore out after only a few uses. But 
optimistic backers formed a new Hookless Fastener Company, and Sundback continued his experiments. 
In 1913, he produced a design very like the modern zipper. In it, the hooks had shrunk to small 
protrusions and the eyes had closed until they were indentations. It synthesized hooks and eyes with their 
absence, and it synthesized hooks with eyes. The two sides of the fastener were composed of identical 
elements. 
Theories of leadership afford an example of dialectic processes operating on a large scale (Webster & 
Starbuck, 1988). Early in the twentieth century, most managers and management theorists asserted that 
organizations work best if they have firm superiors and obedient subordinates. Some fortunate people, it 
was said, had inherent traits that made them good leaders whereas the less fortunate did not. 
By the 1930s, this orthodoxy had elicited counter arguments: Barnard argued that authority is something 
that subordinates grant rather than something that superiors impose. Weber pointed out that 
organizations may depersonalize leadership and that subordinates may think their superiors lack 
legitimacy. The Hawthorne studies presented evidence that subordinates produce more when they have 
friendly superiors. 
Syntheses emerged during the 1950s. Some psychologists studied democratic leadership; others 
documented the sharing of leadership tasks among members of work groups; and still others analyzed the 
distinctive personalities of different kinds of leaders. Bales distinguished leaders' social roles from their 
task roles. Then the Ohio State leadership studies decomposed subordinates' perceptions of their 
superiors into two statistically independent dimensions - initiating structure and consideration. Initiating 
structure embodied the essential properties of the leadership concepts of 19 10, and consideration 
embodied the concepts of the 1930s. Thus, antithetical views had become distinct dimensions of a 
complex phenomenon. 
3. Reprise 
'7 think there is a world market for aboutjive computers. " Thomas J. Watson, President, International 
Business Machines, 1943. 
Watson later helped his son lead IBM's expansion in computers. 
No one should be confident that their current beliefs and methods are optimal. Optimality is unlikely. If 
beliefs seem accurate, someone else is probably finding other beliefs equally effective. If methods seem 
excellent today, better methods will appear tomorrow. Thus, one is well-advised to remain ever skeptical. 
"It isn't good enough" and "It's only an experiment" are mental frameworks that help one stay constantly 
alert for opportunities to improve. "It isn't good enough" reminds one to look for more accurate beliefs or 
better methods. "It's only an experiment" helps one to feel less committed to current beliefs and methods. 
Because current beliefs and methods bias information gathering, signals from one's environment tend to 
support these beliefs and methods. To obtain dissonant signals, one may have to be proactive. Thus, one 
should try to turn surprises into question marks, should respond to  dissents and warnings as if they have 
some validity, and should act as if collaborators' ideas are as deserving as one's own. 
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It may be difficult to respect the views of strangers unversed in current methods and unfamiliar with 
recent efTorts. But strangers can see errors or opportunities to which the indoctrinated are blind. 
One wanting to challenge current beliefs and to discover alternative methods can apply two logical 
techniques. "All causal arrows have two heads" helps one to look for neglected feedback paths. "The 
converse of every proposition is equally valid" helps one to reframe current beliefs within more general 
schemata. 
"There is no reason for any individual to have a computer in their home." Ken Olson, President, Digital 
Equipment Corporation, 19 7 7. 
Five years later, DEC began to sell microcomputers. 
Note: This article benefits from the insights of Raghu Garud, John Hedberg, and John Mezias. 
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